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Such a procedure required an undesired EBT with much wasted
time, effort and expense which resulted in a more restricted discovery than the one now given under CPLR 3120.
The amendment retains the content of the previous section
concerning the party but places this material under subdivision
(a). Subdivision (b) is completely new and permits discovery and
production of information from a non-party witness by referring
directly back to subdivision (a). However, there are important
differences between (a) and (b).
For a full discussion of this amendment, see Professor David
D. Siegel's 1966 Commentary in McKinney's CPLR.
CPLR 3126: Attorney fees not given as penalty for
failure to disclose.
Under CPLR 3126, if a party refuses to.comply with an
order for disclosure, or wilfully fails to disclose information which
a court finds should have been disclosed, the court may, inter alia,
strike out the defendant's pleadings until the order is obeyed, or
render a default judgment against the disobedient party. 9 In
order to provide for an alternative to the harsh sanctions contained
in CPLR 3126, the Judicial Conference in 1966 recommended the
addition of a new section to the CPLR. This section would
permit courts to require parties who make disclosure motions
necessary, i.e., parties who ignore a notice of disclosure, to pay costs
and expenses. This penalty would be imposed unless failure to
disclose was "unavoidable" or "justifiable." 60 This recommendation
was never acted upon by the legislature. However, case law has
provided its own alternatives to the provisions expressed in CPLR
3126. In Nomako v. Ashton,61 the court refrained from implementing the drastic penalties of CPLR 3126, but only upon the condition that the wrongdoer pay his adversary's full bill of costs,
including costs and disbursements on appeal and counsel fees.
In Nomako, the defendant failed to obey a court order for
disclosure. Since notice is also a method of obtaining disclosure,
the question arose whether CPLR 3126 was applicable to the
disregard of a disclosure notice.62 In Gaffney v. City of New
York,03 the court held that mere notice of disclosure is not enough.
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The party is required to have obtained a court order under CPLR
3124 in order to utilize the penalties of CPLR 3126. However,
it has recently been held, in Fleming v. Fleming,6" that notice
of disclosure is sufficient to enforce the penalties of CPLR 3126.
There the court said:
To invite disregard of a notice for an examination or a
inspection by effectively removing any real sanctions
intents and purposes 'import into the disclosure practice
the abuses against which our courts inveighed under bills
practice under the CPA.' 65
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Although Fleming upheld the notice of disclosure, it refused
to grant attorney fees since there was no express statutory provision for this sanction, and the proposals for the attorney fee
provision had been rejected by the Advisory Committee in 1961
and again in 1966.66
The question thus arises as to whether a court may require the
payment of attorney fees without an express statutory mandate.
Under CPLR 3126, the court is empowered to "make such orders
with regard to the failure or refusal as are just. . . ." This section
lists several of the sanctions which the court may enforce. The
language of the section seems to indicate that the enumerated
sanctions are not the exclusive remedies which a court may impose.
Since the courts are hesitant to impose the harsh penalties stated
in CPLR 3126, the wrongdoer actually receives a benefit. Instead
of being punished, he will be warned that if he does not submit
to an EBT, a 3126 motion will be granted against him. Thus,
by not actually imposing a penalty, CPLR 3126 apparently loses
its effect. The middle ground would seem to be the imposition
of costs and counsel fees, thus retaining the effectiveness of CPLR
3126 while mitigating the harshness of the penalties imposed.
ARTICLE 32 CPLR 3211(a) (4):

ACcELERATED JUDGMENT

Stay granted upon condition.

In Gallo v. Mayer 6 7 plaintiff, after commencing a state court
action for breach of contract and common-law fraud, instituted a
federal court action, based on the same facts, for a violation of the
Securities Exchange Act. The federal action included an additional
6450 Misc. 2d 323, 270 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Sup. Ct Queens County 1966).
65 Id. at 325, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 355. See also 1966 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 90,
ELEVENTH

ANNUAL

REPORT

OF

THE

JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE

WEINSTEIN, KoRN & MILLER, NEW YORK CivIL PRAcTICE

372-73;

3126.02 (1965).

3

66 Id. at 326, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
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